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German and Italian electricity tariffs are the highest in Europe? A
United Kingdom ("UK") consumer pays roughly a quarter less than in
Germany. A medium-sized industrial company in Germany, for instance,
would pay 7.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, while a similar company in Great
Britain would pay only 5.5 cents.3 The average costs in Germany for a
private household are 18 cents per kilowatt-hour.4 According to the
consumer protection organization Association of Energy Consumers
("Bund der Energieverbraucher") each average household pays about 100
€ per year too much for electricity. 5 At the moment, large energy suppliers
are planning a price-increase of more than 5%. German politicians and
industrialists are aware that the inflated prices are detrimental to economic
development which is already suffering from an ongoing structural crisis.
For this reason, Wolfgang Clement, German Minister of Economy and
Labour, submitted a draft for an amendment to the Energy Industry Act
("Energiewirtschajtsgesetz" - EnWG), which was passed by the Federal
Cabinet on 28-7-04 and is now being processed for enactment in
legislative procedure.6 The aim is the creation of a legal framework for
I The author is professor of Public Law, particularly Environmental and Energy Law at the University of
Lueneburg. Special thanks are given to Mr Jan Busse, Attorney at Law, and Ms Anna Voelkner, student of
environmental sciences, for their groundwork. I am grateful to Jennifer Stephens for her assistance in
translation.
2 See http://www.vik.de/aktuelVpressemitteilungenlpm040719.htrn; s. also Der Spiegel 33/2004, p. 58.
3 See Vorholz, Ministers in favour ofthe Monopoly (Minister fUr das Monopol), "Die Zeit" 33/2004, p. 19.
4 See Eurostat, Electricity Tariffs for Private Households in the European Union on 1 January 2004
(Strompreisefur die privaten Haushalte in der EU am 1. Januar 2004).
5 See Die Welt, 31 August 2004 (http://www.welt.de/data/2004/08/31/326232.html?prx~I).
6 Draft of a Second Act for the Reorganization of the Power Industry Law (Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur
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further liberalisation of electric energy- and gas-markets, with special
focus on the reduction of energy prices.
The energy industry is subject to conditions substantially different
from other economic sectors, especially, dependence on a distribution
network, high capital intensity and limited power storage capacity. These
conditions favour the creation of monopolies and are not affected by new
European directives and regulations or by national laws. Efforts to break
these "natural monopolies" and lower prices must take these factors into
consideration in order to reduce restrictions and agree on more favourable
energy prices.
The aim of this article is to provide an overview on the substantial
problems involved in the formation of energy prices in Germany. It will
emphasize the reasons for high energy prices in Germany and possible
means of price lowering. Owing to substantial differences between the
electric energy market and the gas market the article is limited to the
former.
It will begin with an overview of relevant European legal regulation
and then explain the historical development of German energy legislation
leading to the present EnWG. That is followed by an analysis of the
composition of electric energy prices in Germany, which forms the central
part of the article, together with an investigation of the conditions under
which energy suppliers allow other companies the use of their networks
(so called "Netznutzungsentgelte"), and of the national energy taxation and
promotion of renewable energies. A review of prospective future
developments concludes the article.
The Framework of European Law
From the beginning, European Law took precedence over national
energy law, through the establishment of the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty (ECSC) of 19517, the European Economic Community
(EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) of 1957.
However, since in the first year's energy supply guarantee played a more
important role than aspects of a common market, energy took no part in
free trade at all and the energy sector only found its place very gradually.8
7 Expired on 23 July 2002, see Obwexer, The end of the European Coal and Steel Community (Das Ende der
Europiiischen Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl), European Journal of Business Law (Europiiische
Zeitschrift /iir Wirtschaftsrecht - EuZW) 2002, 517 IT.
8 See Ludwig/Koopmann, Development and Sources of Private Energy Law (Entwicklung und Rechtsquellen
des privaten Energierechts), in RayermanniLoibl (editors), Energy Law (Energierecht), 2003, p. 54 f.
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Even today, the main topic of European energy law is still the creation of a
common market, in connection with the Iiberalisation of energy markets.
One of the main goals is the installation of a fair and competitive energy
pricing system. The following regulations are relevant.
Foremost are relevant regulations on the free movement of goods
(Art. 23 - 31 EEC) within the EC treaty. Both electricity and gas are goods
in the sense of Art. 23 and 24 EEC and are tradable without restriction
according to the rules of the common market. The rules of competition in
Art. 81 - 89 EEC are also relevant. The prohibition of agreements between
commercial undertakings in Art. 81 EEC, the prohibition of the abuse of a
dominant market position in Art. 82 EEC, the regulations on public
undertakings (Art. 86 EEC) as well as the prohibition of aids granted by
states in Art. 87 EEC have a direct bearing on the liberalisation of the
European energy market and subsequently on price formation.9
The harmonization clause of Art. 95 EC is the substantial connecting
factor in European secondary law. To this end the European "council
shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251
and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market." The
majority of energy law regulations were based on this premise, in view of
the greater efficiency of the co-decision procedure covered by Art. 251 EC
than the principle of unanimity as required by Art. 94 EC. 10
The starting point for the liberalisation of the energy markets is the
directive 96/92/EC I1 set up in 1997, which established common rules for
the production of electrical power, its transmission and distribution for the
ED-member states. The aim of this directive was the opening up of
markets, by creation of non-discriminative grid access, enabling
customer's personal choice of energy supplier. This development should
grow through several phases. An initial market opening index of 30% for
electricity and 20 % for gas was required but most member states
subsequently went beyond these proportions. Both Germany and Great
9 See Scbneider. The Legal Framework of European Energy Law (Vorgaben des europiiischen Energierechts),
in Scbneider/Theobald, Handbook ofEnergy Law (Handbuch zum Recht der Energiewirtschaft), 2003, p. 77 f.
10 Ludwig/Koopmann, op. cit., p. 57.
II Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common
rules for the internal market in electricity, ABI. EO No. L 027 of 30. I. 1997, p. 20.
22
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
Britain have had a nominally free energy market since 1998. 12 France, in
an attempt to protect its own natural energy companies, was able to
postpone European development on the liberalisation of energy markets in
Europe for some time. 13 The directive demands further that there be a
separation of energy production from transmission and distribution
(financial unbundling).
In 2003 the former directive was replaced by the Electricity
Directive 2003/54/EC I4 and the Gas Directive 55/30/EG. 15 Apart from the
financial unbundling which was extended to include unbundling under
company law the important contents of these directives are the guarantee
of a non-discriminative grid access and the compulsion of member states
to set up national supervision structures in the shape of regulating
authorities. A time limit until 1-7-04 was set for the transferral of most
legal requirements in these directives into national law. The energy
industry has been given until 1-7-07 to implement the unbundling
concerning company law.
One further relevant European act is Regulation 1228/2003 on cross-
border exchanges in electricity which has been valid since 1-7-04. 16 The
intention of this binding regulation is to improve competition by defining
the rules of fair play in the transnational electricity trade. The regulation
includes not only balance mechanisms between transmission network
operators but also a fundamental ruling on grid access fees for cross-
border transmissions and the assignment of transmission capacities. The
installation of a regulatory board for the transnational electricity trade is
also compulsory.
It could be said that European energy industry law has tightened the
framework for individual national regulations over the last years.
However much clearance was initially given for the implementation of
liberalisation without a regulatory board, German experience indicates that
all member states need such an authority.
"German Electricity Association (VDEW), Price Development from 1998 2003,
http://www.strom.de/wysstr/stromwys.nsf/WYSFramesetl ?Readform&JScript-I&..
13 See SChwarzer, The Energy Market (Der Energiemarkt), in RayerrnannlLoibl (Editors), Energy Law
(Energierecht), 2003, p. 17 ff.
14 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC.
IS Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of22 June 1998 concerning common rules
for the internal market in natural gas, ABI. L 176, S. 57.
16 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of26 June 2003 on conditions
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, ABI. L 176, S. I.
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Historical Development of the German Energy Law Sector
a) The Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschajtsgesetz) from 1935
German energy law and its system can only be understood if
something is known about their historical origin. The Energy Industry Act
(Energiewirtschajtsgesetz - EnWG) created under National Socialist Rule
in 1935 was the first energy law to cover the whole country. 17 This law
remained in force until the opening of the market in 1998. 18 The aim of
the 1935 Act was to arrange a supply of electricity and gas as safely and
cheaply as possible. 19 Under the EnWG 1935 it was only possible to start
supplying power after a permit had been granted by the state.
The central element of the EnWG 1935, described in § 6, was the
general connection and supply obligation on the part of the power supply
firm responsible for that particular area. The energy customers of the area
for their part had a claim against the supplier. 20 There was no separation
made between the electricity network and the electricity supply. In
addition to this the possibility of a different supplier using the network did
not exist. Since parallel cabling was not possible, this led to the creation
of a power supply monopoly in one area.21 Since the customer had no
choice of supplier, there was no competition. According to § 7 EnWG
1935, energy prices were fixed in ordinance decrees. 22 Thus, in the shape
of the Reichsminister of Economy and later the Federal Minister for
Economy the state exercised a crucial influence on the German energy
industry. This influence existed over many decades and ensured a high
17 Act to Promote Energy Industry of 13 December 1935 (Gesetz zur F6rderung der Energiewirtschaft vom 13.
12.1935), RGBI.lp 1451
18 See Reuz, From Monopoly to Competition (Vom Monopol zum Wettbewerb), Opladen, 2001.
19 This is expressed in the preamble of the EnWG.
20 See LudwiglKoopmann , op. cit., p. 30.
21 The monopoly-like area protection was flanked by special arrangements under competition law in §§ 103 and
103 a of the former Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen -GWB).
22 See § II of the Energy-Industry-Act ("Energiewirtschaftsgesetz") and § 1I of the Federal Tariffs Regulation
for Electricity (Bundestarifordnung Elektrizitiit- BTOElt) of 18. 12. 1989 (BGBI. I S. 2255) and the
Regulation on General Tariffs for Gas Supply (Verordnung uber Allgemeine Tarife fur die Versorgung mit
Gas-Bundestarifordnung Gas - BTO-Gas) of 10 February 1959 (BGBI. I p. 46).
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standard of supply securit/3 and comparatively low energy prices. The
Act was not concerned with either competitive aspects or ecological
considerations.
b) The 1998 Energy Industry Act ("Energiewirtschaftsgesetz -
EnWG").
The transference of the European Electricity Directive24 into German
law in 1998 marked a turning point for German energy industry law. The
main body of the EnWG amendment led to the opening up of the energy
markets for competition. This represented a fundamental change in the
electricity generation industry?5
The contemporary EnWG differs substantially from its predecessor.
§ 1 EnWG was extended to include the environmental sustainability of an
energy supply. State permit requirements for the deployment of energy
supply were largely restricted (§ 3). The electricity supply network had to
be so regulated within the electricity companies that a clear separation
could be made between the transmission network and energy production
and distribution. The aim of this distinction was to prevent cross-
subsidization or any form of discrimination (§ 4 expo 4 EnWG).
To enable the domestic electricity market to enjoy fair competition it
was necessary to allow access for secondary providers into the supply
network. This was the key element of the EnWG 1998 which is still valid
although future amendment is expected. The existing energy network user
monopoly was dissolved. Unlike other EU-member states Germany has
no regulatory board, but instead employed the so-called negotiated
network access ("Verhandelter Netzzugang" - see § 5 EnWG 1998).
Anyone wishing to transmit electricity through somebody else's network is
granted a claim to draw up a contract with the network owner. The price
for using the network is decided on by mutual consent between the
network owner and the energy supplier. The sum must lie within the
limits of good practice, and not over that which the network owners charge
within their own company or from connected companies (§ 6 expo 1
EnWG 1998). The network owner can only deny access if the
23 The average interruption duration of electricity supply for each customer in minutes amounts to 15 min. per
year in Germany, 63 min. per year in Great Britain and 191 min. per year in Italy (Council of European
Energy Regulators, according to German Electricity Association - VDEW 2001).
24 See above.
25 See Ludwig/Koopmann, p. 32.
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transmission is physically impossible or incompatable with internal
company arrangements. The detailed computation of network-access
prices is negotiated by different supplier associations; the results are the
so-called associate agreements (" Verbaendevereinbarungen ,,)26. Relevant
associations are the German Electricity Association ("Verband der
Elektrizitaetswirtschaft -VDEW), the Umbrella Association of German
Industry ("Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie" - BDI) and the
Association of Energy- and Power Industries ("Verband der Industriellen
Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft" - VIK). Adherence to the association
agreements according to § 6 EnWG 1998 fulfils the conditions of good
practice. 27
At the same time as the amendment to the EnWG 1998 the
Competition Act ("Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen" - GWB)28
was also altered. As a result the electric energy and gas companies were
forced to renounce their pole position in competition law. The "Essential-
Facilities-Doctrine" ensured, in addition, that misuse of a dominant market
position is assumed only when a company denies access to its network to
another supplier without sufficient reason, as specified in the law (§ 19
expo 4 No.4 GWB).
The Composition of the Electricity Tariff and Reasons for the
Development of Prices
A number of different factors affect electricity tariffs, of which national
legislation is a relatively minor one.
a) Composition of the Electricity Tariff
The electricity industry, government and the opposition all blame each
other for the high price of electricity tariffs. While the power supply firms
26 Federal Legal Gazette(Bundesanzeiger), BAnz No. 85 b of 8. 5. 2002; the first associate agreement dated
from May 1998; since January 2002 the associate agreement II plus is in use (" Verbaendevereinbarung 11
plus).
27 In the case of the associate agreement II plus this has been confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of
Duesseldorf (OLG Duesseldorf, Decision of 11.02.2004 -Kart 4/03 (V), Journal for New Energy Law
(Zeitschrijifuer neues Energierecht) ZNER 04, p. 76 ff.).
28 Of 26 August 1998, BGB!. I p. 2546.
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hold rising taxes as well as the subsidization of renewable energy sources
responsible,29 the consumer associations30 believe that the considerable
rise in electricity tariffs is a result of the existing oligopoly of the four
main German power suppliers, despite the opening up of the energy.
market.
The component parts making up the price of electricity in Germany
(other than fuel) are:




Costs laid out by Renewable Energy Sources Act
("Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz" - EEG) and Power- 3,74%Heat-Combination Act ("Kraft- Waerme-
Kopplungsgesetz" - KWKG):
\Current Procurement, Marketing, Human Resources: \27,49%
An example for the calculation:3 !
IEl~ctricity bill €/month (3.550 kWh/a) r--r--I I-
I 120001200112002[2003I
IProduction/transportation/sales !25,15 [25,05 !28,29!29,75
[Concession fee 15,22 [5,22 15,22 1 5,22
ICost distribution as laid down by KWKG 10,38 10,59 10,78 -[ 0,91
[Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) 10,53 10,63 11,02 1 1,28
\Green Tax/Electricity Tax 13,73 14,47 15,22 15,97
[VAT 15,6 [ 5,76 [6,48 16,91
[Total 140,61 \41,72 \46,99[50,04
29 See, for example, "Die Welt" of II September 2004, http://www.weltde/data/2004/08/31/326232.html?prx~l.
]0 See, for example, Association of Energy Consumers (Bund der Energieverbraucher e. V.),
www.energienetz.de/index.php4.
31 Source: German Electricity Association (VDEW), according to "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" of 5
February 2003, p. 13.
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b) Overcharged Network Users
Although theoretically with the new legislation of the EnWG 1998 a
complete opening up of the market was achieved enabling companies to
use second-party networks, in practice this has not happened. This is
probably because the network access fees are too high to allow other
companies to enter the market. So, although the network owners are
obliged by law to allow third-party companies to transmit current through
their network at the same tariff they charge themselves, in practice these
tariffs have been artificially lowered by cross-subsidizing within the
companies. According to estimates given out by the consumer
organization, Association of Energy Consumers ("Bund der
Energieverbraucher"), the energy companies made profits of € 10.56
billion from network user fees from householders alone while only 2
billion euros were invested in the network. 32 The network user fees in
Germany are well above the average in comparison with the rest of
Europe. 33 Compared with the UK, for example, they are currently up to
three times as high. In spite of this, the large German network owners are
planning to raise the transmission fees by, in some cases, almost 10%.34
EnWG 1998 has failed to deliver genuine competition. Although the
German energy market is completely liberalized, there are four major
trusts who split the market between them, almost monopolizing trade in
their particular areas. The largest is E.ON with 12,9 billion euros turnover,
followed by RWE (12.2 billion), VattenJall (8.3 billion) and EnBW (7.4
billion).35 It seems as though each has acknowledged the other's area
monopoly, and will not compete with each other. When, in addition to
this, other companies are discouraged by high network access fees from
participating, competition becomes well nigh impossible and the
monopolists are able to set their prices to their own advantage. As a result
32 See www.energienetz.de/index.php4.
33 Bohne/ Frenzel, "Formal and Informal Order of the Access to the Electricity Market" (Formale und informale
Ordnung des Zugangs zum Strommarkt), in Hendler! Marburger/ Reinhardt! Schroeder (Editors), Journal of
Environmental- and Technical Law (Jahrbuch des Urn welt- und Technikrechts) 2003,71, p. 363 ff.
34 Thus RWE Electricity Transportation Ltd. (RWE Transportnetz Strom GmbH) plans an increase of the
transmission fees on high voltage level of 9,6 %0, see "Die Welt", 31 August 2004,
http://www.welt.de/data/2004/08/3l/326232.htmj?prx~ 1.
34 Draft ofa Second Act for the Reorganization of the Energy Industry Act (BR-Drs 613/04), see above.
35 Data from 2003, source: Dohmen, Der Spiegel, 33, 2004, p. 58 f.
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liberalization of the energy market in Germany has largely failed and
German prices remain the highest in Europe.36
c) Taxes and Impacts of Ecological Motivation on Energy Prices
For their part, the four large power supply firms claim that the encumbent
red-green coalition in the Federal Government is responsible for the high
prices. It is a fact that tax and various ecologically based surcharges
together amount to approx. 40%.37 There is a distinction between eco-
motivated surcharges like Electricity Tax (1), Renewable Energy Sources
Act (EEG) and the Power-Heat-Combination Act (KWKG) (2) and the
inevitable payments of VAT and concession fees (3).
(l) Electricity Tax
An electricity tax ("Stromsteuergesetz" - StromStG38), governed by the
Electricity Tax Act, was introduced under the ecological tax reform in
1999. The point of this tax is continuously to raise the price of electricity
in the hope of encouraging energy saving and, at the same time, to increase
the demand for production procedures that use less energy. The price of
electricity for the consumer is governed by a tax initially charged to the
energy producers. As of 2002 this tax amounts to 20.50 euros per
megawattlhr (2.5 cent per kw/hr) with reductions for users of environment-
friendly energy, such as that from renewable energy sources. The tax in
2001 brought a total sum ofE 4.3 billion. Electricity produced with energy
using wind-force, methane, sewage gas, biomass and solar and geothermal
energy, as well as hydro-electric power (plant-generator up to 10
megawatts) is completely tax-free.39
The electricity tax at present amounts to 10% of the price. Since
there are no plans to raise this percentage, it cannot be blamed for the
rising prices.
36 See also Smeddinck, The Evaluation Clause in § 8 EnWG - Innovation Control by 'Energy Law (Die
Evaluierungsklausel in § 8 En WG - Innovationssteuerung durch Energierecht), Journal for New Energy Law
(Zeitschr/ft fuer neues Energierecht) ZNER 2002, 295, 299 f.
37 Source: Dohmen, Der Spiegel, 33,2004, S. 61.
38 From 24 March 1999 (BGBl I S. 378, 2000 1 S. 147); see Rodi, in: Schneider/Theobald (see above),




Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
(2) Power and Heat Combination Act {"Kraft- Waerme-
Kopplungsgesetz - KWKG") and Renewable Energy Sources Act
(Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz - EEG)
The Renewable Energy Sources Act40 is of particular interest. It is
the intention of the federal government to raise the contribution of solar,
wind and waterpower, bio- and geothermal energy to the total energy
production grid to at least 12,5% by 2010 with a view to achieving at least
20% by 2020.41 In order to achieve this power from renewable energy
sources should be bought by the nearest network owner at a higher price
than traditionally produced electricity (§§ 3 ff. EEG).42 This network
owner transfers the increase in costs to the next transmission network
operator, after which the costs are shared between all German transmission
networks. Finally, all electric -energy suppliers delivering power to
consumers are obliged to buy electricity produced from renewable energy
sources from the transmission network operators. In this way the
production from renewable sources is not directly state-subsidized.
Rather, it is the large energy supply companies who foot the bill, before
passing on all the increased costs to the consumers at a ratio of one to one.
The production of wind-energy has benefited particularly from this form
of support, contributing 5.59% towards total energy production of 2003. 43
Further ecologically motivated surcharges on the electricity price are
the result of the Power-Heat Combination Act (KWKG).44 With § 1 of
this Act, environmental protection, in the shape of an annual reduction of
20 - 23 m tons of C02, through support, modernization and development
of power-heat-coupling plants and introduction of gas cells is envisaged.
The Act is intended to remain valid until 31. 12. 2010 unless extended.
The support of these plants is similar to the procedure in the case of the
Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). The energy produced by these
40 The revised version entered into force on I August 2004 (Federal Law Gazette -"Bundesgesetzhlatt"- BGB!.
I, p. 1918 If.).
41 See the reasons for the Renewable Energies Act given by the Federal Government, Bundestag - Materials
(Bundestags-Drucksache) BT-Drs 15/2864.
42 See for details Brandt/ReshOft/Steiner, Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien-Gesetz), 2001,
§ 3, edge- number I ff.; Schneider, "Environmental Energy Law" (Energieumweltrecht), in
Schneider/Theobald, op. cit., p. 998 ff.
43 See http://www.wind-energie.de/informationenlzahlen-zur-windenergie/031231-dewi-zahlen.pdf.
44 Act for the Preservation, the Modernization and the Development of Power-Heat Coupling of 19 March 2002
(Gesetz fuer die Erhaltung, die Modernisierung und den Ausbau der Kraft-Waerme-Kopplung vom /9. 3.
2002), BGB!. I p. 1092.
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plants must also be bought by the closest adjacent network operator. A
surcharge is placed as set down in § 7 KWKG in addition to the agreed fee
and, again, the costs must be spread evenly among the network operators
in the whole country.
The charges incurred by the EEG and KWKG amount to
approximately 4% of the electricity tariff. In no way can this low
percentage of the total price be held responsible for the current increase in
electricity tariffs.
(2) Further Fees
Both VAT, at present 16%, and concession fees which energy suppliers
must pay to the municipalities, are charged in addition to the electricity
tariffs. Neither of these can be understood as ecologically motivated. VAT
is charged in Germany for every domestic business transaction.45
Concession fees are charged by the municipalities for the usage of
communal property if cables are laid by network operators. The sum,
which is dependent on the population of the town, is charged by the
municipalities for the usage of public roads when laying cables or gas
pipes.
Since both these fees existed before the introduction of ecologically
motivated surcharges they cannot be used to explain the rise in prices
either.
d) Results
Taking the development of electricity prices into account it becomes
obvious that, although there is a high increase in charges due to
EEG/KWKG and electricity tax, owing to their low percentage
contribution to the total electricity price of approximately 14% it is
minimal. However, there have been major increases in the costs of
production, transport and distribution. The reasons for this lie largely with
the energy production companies and in the going prices for energy
sources such as coal, gas and oil. Considering the fact that the network
transmission carries approximately 32% of the total non-fuel price of
electricity, any rise in costs will affect the electricity price enormously.
45 See § 1 expo 1 No 1 Value Added Tax Act (Umsatzsteuergesetz -UstG).
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Future Development of the German Energy Sector
a) Opportunities for the Lowering of Prices
There are two ways of lowering electricity tariffs in Germany: namely the
reduction of fees or the removal of monopolies in the electricity market.
It would be possible to reduce the electricity tariffs by lowering the
tax or lowering or abolishing the subsidies for renewable energy sources
and power-heat-coupling. This would be a major political decision.
Considering budget deficits and the difficulties caused by ever-increasing
prices for traditional finite energy resources, it is safe to say that not even a
conservative government's legislation would have much impact. Should
the ecologically motivated charges be abolished, it would have little affect
on the rising electricity tariffs. On the contrary, a removal of the EEG and
the KWKG would cause great legal difficulties since investors in
renewable energy plants have been guaranteed delivery into the net at a
rate higher than traditionally produced electricity.
The overpriced network access fees mark the greatest obstacle
preventing a general liberalization of the electricity market. A reduction
of the present high level of network access fees in relation to the total
electricity tariff would appear the best way of lowering electricity costs for
the consumer. To achieve this there are plans to amend the Energy
Industry Act (EnWG).
b) A Critical View on the Planned Amending of the EnWG
The draft produced by the Federal Government for the amendment of the
Energy Industry Act (EnWG) has increased the previous 24 paragraphs to
118. The draft is built around three main components, namely EnWG, a
transitory act and the installation of the Federal Regulation Board.
The modified version of the EnWG covers the following aspects:
General Rules, Unbundling, Regulation of Networks, Energy Supply to the
Consumer, Planning and Traffic Line Usage, Security and Energy Supply
Reliability, Regulation Board, Procedures and Miscellaneous Guidelines.
A major change from the previous EnWG is the inclusion of
consumer protection. Although subjects such as the conversion from finite
energy resources to sustainable energy sources, the increase in electricity
efficiency and the promotion of decentralized electricity and gas
production were requested by the NGOs, none has been included in the
draft.
32
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
A more detailed unbundling than in the present EnWG is planned.
The idea behind this is the prevention of cross-subsidization between the
line operation and other areas of the energy industry within vertically
integrated power supply firms. It is hoped that this can be achieved
through unbundling under company law. The only exception to this rule
would be companies supplying fewer than 100,000 customers.
Unfortunately criticism has been made that the generous transitory
regulation will give little incentive to companies to comply with the new
terms before 2007.
By far the strongest criticism however has been expressed in relation
to the third section of the draft, in which the fixing of network access fees
is dealt with. The basis for this fixing are the costs of a management-
biased energy industry (§ 21 expo 2 of the draft). Details are to be
regulated by statutory order ("Rechtsverordnung"). The calculation of
access fees, solely based on costs, stands in contrast to the principles of
fair competition in the eyes of the critics. In addition to this, the
regulatory board can only bring decisions to bear on the conditions and
methods for the fixing of net access fees but is unable to set price limits.
Since prior permission of the tariffs by the adjustment authority is not
intended, control as to whether the rules were kept by the line operators
would predominantly take place ex post facto. Only should the tariffs be
higher than average would the adjustment authority take action (settlement
proceeding according to § 21 expo 3 and 4 EnWG-draft). The competency
of the adjustment authority is set down in §§ 29 ff EnWG-draft. This
competency includes specifying or altering the regulation governing net
access and, should line operators show misconduct to second parties, they
may be reprimanded and in the case of such behaviour the ill-gained profit
may be fined (§ 33 EnWG-draft). Apart from this, persons and groups, in
particular, consumer protection associations, are granted the right to an
investigation after allegations of misconduct on the part of a line operator
(§ 31 expo 1 EnWG-draft). Such persons are also allowed damages in the
case of non-fulfilment of terms or misconduct on the part of the line
operator (§ 32 EnWG-draft). In certain circumstances a successful claim
can result in profit gained by misconduct being syphoned off and handed
over to the State (§ 34 EnWG-draft). On top of this a fine can be imposed
according to § 95 EnWG-draft. The overall result of these measures is a
continuing control of net access fees and also of the electricity price for the
authorities and consumers.
Both arrangements for taxing surplus profits (borrowed from Anglo-
American law) and damages liability in misconduct cases seem powerful
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means of asserting pressure on line-operators. This draft is been
questioned by some critics since the tariffs already seem exorbitant. The
demand is made for differentiated regulations, in other words, that the
basis for cost fixation be effective production and supply without the
addition of fictitious components and perhaps even inflated profits.
A further substantial point of criticism concerns the strong position
of the Federal Ministry of Economy and Work, as foreseen by the draft,
although the federal adjustment authority ("Regulierungsbehoerde") is
responsible for the adjustment according to the seventh part of the draft.
In order to give competence directives this body is under the auspices of
the Federal Ministry of Economy and Labour. Neither the Ministry of
Environment nor Consumer Protection has the ability to exercise much
influence so there is a danger that the goal of comprehensive consumer
protection cannot be reached. There is also an accusation of strong
personal connections between the Federal Ministry of Economy and
Labour and the power industry. It is feared that the adjustment authority
will not be unbiased in its decision-making, as demanded in Art. 23 of the
Domestic Electricity Market Directive, but will rather follow the interests
of the power industry.
c) Final Critical View
When seen in context, it becomes obvious that the shape of the proposed
draft will not make much headway towards a genuine liberalization. The
adjustment authorities' hands are tied in strong contrast to the telecoms
area. State regulations governing the conditions for net-access, including
the methods for the setting-out of these conditions as well as methods for
the fixing of prices for net access (§ 24 sentence I of the draft) take the
place of negotiated net access. It is to be expected that this will not be
much more transparent. Genuine liberalization and de-monopolizing can
only take place if all conditions are clear. In its present form the draft does
in fact look suspicious as though the underlying goal lies in securing the
preservation of the status quo within the power industry.
The Federal Ministry of Economy and Labour claims that a law
governing the security of energy supply in the interests of the energy
industry is necessary.46 It is not evident, however, that increased
competition must lead to power cuts. This eventuality could be prevented
by other means, e.g., by appropriate security requirements for power
46 See Vorholz, Ministers in favour of the Monopoly (Minister fur dos Monopol), Die Zeit, No 33, 2004, p. 19.
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supplier or line operators. The 6th part of the draft deals specifically with
the security and reliability ofpower supply.
The draft is at present (September 2004) in the initial stages of the
legislative procedure. Since it is subject to the consensus of the Second
House of Parliament ("Bundesrat"), in the course of being passed through
the "Bundesrat," it will probably undergo many changes. As it stands at
the moment, it does not look as though the draft will have a positive effect
on competitive electricity tariff formation in Germany.
Dr. Thomas Schomerus
University of Lueneburg.
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